

MABAS-WISCONSIN *in ACTION*

VOLUME 4, ISSUE 3

SUMMER 2013

A quarterly report of MABAS WISCONSIN activities to underscore its value to the community and to foster growth and improvement through the sharing of actual experience

ECHO FOODS - THE LARGEST MABAS DEPLOYMENT TO DATE

BY SOUTH SHORE FD DIVISION CHIEF MARK PIERCE, MABAS DIVISION 102 PRESIDENT

It was 6pm on a cold winter night of January 30, 2013 at the Echo Lake Foods processing plant when a fire was reported. The 70,000 square foot facility produced breakfast style entrees, such as French toast, pancakes, waffles and various egg products. **This incident would turn into the largest response in MABAS Wisconsin history.**

The plant began in 1941 with numerous expansions over the years, straddling the boundary of the Town and **City of Burlington**, which is located in the far southwest corner of Racine County (**MABAS Div 102**).

The situation escalated quickly. Assistant
(Continued on page 2)



Inside this issue:

Incident Reporting Important	2
Echo Foods - The Weather	3
Echo Foods - The Layout	4
IMTs: The Who What & Why	6
Div 109 In Action - Plane in Lake Michigan	7
Reflecting on the Previous Largest MABAS Deployment	8
The Southeast Wisconsin Incident Management Team	10
Deployment of the SEW IMT	12
MABAS Division Map	14

PRESIDENT'S CORNER *BY ED JANKE, VILLAGE OF HOWARD, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY*

MABAS Wisconsin is set to achieve 50 divisions. Communities across the State are continuing to develop their capability to access the MABAS system, a system that will seamlessly provide an adequate level of resources in an emergency to the communities we serve.

MABAS helps us to facilitate the movement of resources across counties, regions and the State and beyond if necessary to provide assistance in any emergency. This all hazards system and processes are detailed in the Wisconsin Fire Service Emergency Response Plan.

Price County has applied for division status. Price County is the first county to apply for division status in the Northwest region. Congratulations to the leaders in Price County for their hard work and effort.

We continue to work towards the ultimate goal of statewide mutual aid allowing communities to access resources in their time of greatest need.

In this issue we will highlight the Echo Foods fire. This is the largest MABAS Wisconsin deployment to date. The Southeast Incident Management

Team and Bill Rice, our Southeast Regional Coordinator, worked tirelessly to assist in bringing this incident to a safe resolution.

As we finalize our "Third Annual Command and Dispatch Conference," I am excited to say that we have built upon our previous conferences and believe this conference will be exceptional. Keith Tveit and the Conference Committee have committed to an exceptional program. I look forward to seeing you at the conference.



The SEW IMT assisting at Echo Lake Foods - see pages 10 & 12 (Photo by SEW IMT)

MABAS WI INCIDENT REPORTING IS VERY IMPORTANT BY RACINE FIRE CHIEF STEVE HANSEN AND GARY SCHMIDT

This newsletter issue is focused on the largest MABAS deployments to date, however, MABAS is used every day to prevent local incidents from becoming large, thereby saving lives and saving money by minimizing property loss. The value of MABAS cannot be understated, yet it is difficult to communicate that message across the State without an effective method to track the MABAS success story.

MABAS Wisconsin has a tool in place to accumulate the use of MABAS. The **Incident Entry Portal** can be accessed via <http://incident.mabaswisconsin.org> or through <http://www.mabaswisconsin.org> using the Databases drop down box. It is critical that local incidents be entered.

Departments should contact their Division President for the login information.



Incident Entry	
Incident Date (yyyy-mm-dd hh:mm:ss)	2013-05-23 11:18:00
Incident Address	3415 Hilltop Way
Community	Green Bay Metro
Division	112
FDID	GREEN BAY FIRE DEPT
Box Card Type	Structure - Hydrant
Local FD's Dispatched	Green Bay Metro Fire Department
Box Alarm Time	12:0
Box Alarm Depts	Green Bay, Howard, De Pere, New F
2nd Alarm Time	12:2
2nd Alarm Depts	Ashwaubenon, Suamico, Ledgeview,
3rd Alarm Time	12:4
3rd Alarm Depts	Hobart, Bellevue, Denmark, Howard
4th Alarm Time	13:4
4th Alarm Depts	Lawrence, Morrison, Pulaski, Green I Wrightstown, Menchalville

ECHO LAKE FOODS - THE LARGEST MABAS DEPLOYMENT TO DATE - CONTINUED

(Continued from page 1)

Chief 929 arrived on scene and reported flames in the southeast building. MABAS Division 102 Box 920-21 was requested at 6:14 and then bumped to the third alarm twenty-two minutes later. While yard hydrants were available, the municipal water supply would be no match for the fire.



(Photo by Larry Shapiro)

Within seven minutes, tender strike teams were requested from neighboring Divisions 103 (Walworth) and 101 (Kenosha). With potentially ammonia-filled smoke drifting to the east, evacuations of residents were ordered.

At 6:50pm, the box was upgraded to the fourth alarm and eighteen minutes later, the City of Racine Fire Department Haz Mat team was called. The local hospital reported walk-ins with smoke inhalation symptoms.

At 7:41pm, on January 30th, the MABAS Box was upgraded to the fifth alarm level. An hour later, the Division 101 tender strike team arrived. Within 10 minutes, a task force was requested from Division 104 (Rock) and a tender strike team was requested from 106 (Waukesha).

At 9:38pm, an interstate MABAS request was made for the MABAS Illinois Division 4 mobile light towers. Division 104 went enroute at 9:25pm and by 10:13, the Division 106 strike team was on the way.

The MABAS Coordinator for the Southeast Region, Bill Rice, arrived on site and began assisting the Incident Command with the scheduling of Operational Work Periods for additional interdivisional

requests. At 10:30pm, Divisions 107 and 115 were notified to have Task Forces on site from Midnight to 5am Thursday January 31st and Divisions 103 and 118 were requested for 5-10am.

Prior to midnight, the Southeast Wisconsin Incident Management Team was requested and the Milwaukee Fire Bell Club was notified to respond at 11pm to assist the Racine Fire Bells (the next morning, the Metropolitan Emergency Support Services rehab group from Illinois Division 4 replaced the Milwaukee rehab group).

In the early morning hours of Thursday January 31st, requests went out for the Div 4 Hose Wagon from Newport, chiefs from Divisions 106, 107, and 109, and a task force from Division 106.

At 10:54am, January 31st, the box was struck out, but units remained on scene and another 24 hours before command was terminated on February 1st at 11:37am.

ECHO LAKE FOODS - THE WEATHER BY SOUTH SHORE FD DIVISION CHIEF MARK PIERCE, MABAS DIVISION 102 PRESIDENT

There were many things working against the firefight, one of them being the weather.

As the evening of January 30th progressed, the temperature dropped 15 degrees to the mid-teens, winds remained gusting between 25 and 30 mph, and periodic snow squalls buffeted the faces of the emergency responders.

For the next 24 hours, the temperature continued to drop to zero, while the winds remained around 20 mph. By 7am Friday February 1, 2013, with fire operations still in progress, the temp dropped to 5 below zero, and would not reach 10 above on that third day. Winds remained 10-15 mph. Pumping engines would freeze up

and slush in the 5" line from Echo Lake would occasionally clog the intake.

After being in the extreme elements for 4-6 hours, many Firefighters found it difficult to climb into the rehab rig for a break as their turnout gear was a frozen stiff mass and would not bend.



(Photo by Larry Shapiro)



(Photo by Burlington FD)

ECHO LAKE FOODS - THE LOCATION BY SOUTH SHORE FD DIVISION CHIEF MARK PIERCE, MABAS DIVISION 102 PRESIDENT

While its isolation from residential areas prevented the fire from attacking homes, getting water and equipment to the scene was challenging. The falling snow covered the dark, winding back

roads that provided access to the food plant. Winds caused the movement of the staging location several times. The fill site for tenders, while being close-by, became an arduous trip once LDH

were stretched across the road in front of the plant for drafting operations from nearby Echo Lake (tenders had to take a roundabout way to access the plant once the LDH was laid). Tender operations continued along with using yard hydrants and drafting from Echo Lake.



(Photo by Burlington FD)

MABAS-WISCONSIN IN ACTION


ECHO LAKE FOODS - THE LAYOUT BY GARY SCHMIDT

The configuration of buildings comprising the Echo Lake Foods plant made for challenging communications.

The maze of interconnecting structures did not provide for a four sided scene; instead, the plant was more of a U-shape. Additionally, the majority of activity on the A-side was to the south end. The bulk of the fire was in the C-D area of the plant.

Access to the property was via roads located at the far northwest corner of the property. The B-Side was tucked inside the U-shape. The D-side had little frontage to work with.

The exterior ground surrounding all sides was sloping down. The parking lot on the A-side was bi-level. The slippery conditions made the slope difficult to traverse.



ECHO LAKE FOODS - THE LIST OF RESPONDING AGENCIES

The list found below was compiled from numerous lists found for the Echo Lake Foods fire. It is not official.

RACINE COUNTY - MABAS Div 102: (12)

City of Burlington
Town of Burlington
Rochester
Raymond
Union Grove
Kansasville
Tichigan
Wind Lake
Waterford
South Shore
City of Racine
Racine Fire Bells

KENOSHA COUNTY - MABAS Div 101: (8)

Bristol
Town of Salem
Silver Lake
Wheatland
Pleasant Prairie
Somers
Paris

WALWORTH COUNTY - MABAS Div 103: (13)

Lauderdale

LaGrange
Lake Geneva
Elkhorn
Lyons
Sharon
East Troy
Bloomfield
Linn
Walworth
Fontana
City of Delavan
Williams Bay
**ROCK COUNTY -
MABAS Div 104: (7)**

Edgerton
Evansville
Clinton
Milton
Turtle
Beloit
Janesville

WAUKESHA COUNTY - MABAS Div 106: (13)

Town of Waukesha
New Berlin
Lisbon
Lannon

Eagle
Big Bend
Vernon
Mukwonago
Town of Brookfield
Menominee Falls
Wales
Pewaukee
Okauchee
**MILWAUKEE
COUNTY - MABAS
Div 107: (10)**
Greendale
Greenfield
Wauwatosa
West Allis
South Milwaukee
North Shore
Hales Corners
Cudahy
Franklin
Oak Creek
**MILWAUKEE CITY
- MABAS Div 109: (2)**
City of Milwaukee
Milwaukee Fire Bell
Club

**DANE COUNTY -
MABAS Div 115: (6)**
Middleton
Blooming Grove
Fitchburg
Verona
Stoughton
Deerfield
**JEFFERSON
COUNTY - MABAS
Div 118: (6)**
Jefferson
Watertown
Palmyra
Helenville
Fort Atkinson
Lake Mills
**LAKE COUNTY
ILLINOIS - MABAS
Div 4: (8)**
Countryside
Antioch
Waukegan
Long Grove
Wauconda
Knollwood
Newport

Metropolitan
Emergency Support
Services (MESS
Canteen)
**MCHEENY
COUNTY ILLINOIS -
MABAS Div 5: (7)**
Huntley
McHenry
Cary
Richmond
Woodstock
Harvard
Marengo
EMS: (2)
MEDIX
Paratech
Special Agencies: (4)
Racine Arson
Investigation Team
Wisconsin State Fire
Marshal
Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco & Firearms
SE Wisconsin Incident
Command Management
Team

ECHO LAKE FOODS - WHERE AM I GOING? BY GARY SCHMIDT, DIRECTOR OF REHAB, MILWAUKEE FIRE BELL CLUB

It was just after 11pm. My partner (retired Greendale Fire Chief Gary Fedder) and I were told to respond with our Rehab unit to staging at the Pick N Save at 1008 Milwaukee Avenue in Burlington. I saw reports of the fire on the 10pm news, so I had an inkling of what was happening. I also was at a MABAS Division 106 training session a few hours earlier held in western Waukesha County, where the presenter's smart phone was going off throughout his presentation (the presenter was SE Regional Coordinator Bill Rice).

Years ago, I found myself in the City of Burlington while looking for a business that turned out to be on the outskirts. So, I knew where Burlington was, but was not really sure exactly where *in* Burlington we were going. I did print out a Google Map before leaving.

"My tender put on 300 miles shuttling water!" – Wind Lake Fire Chief Rob Robbins

It had been snowing on and off that evening, so travel was challenging. When we arrived at the staging area we were given, we found an empty, darkened parking lot (staging had moved). We travelled further into the city, passing a Police Officer who was blocking the road. *He was wearing a mask over his mouth. "Is there something we should know?"* I asked my partner.

I needed to coordinate with the Rehab unit on the scene, but did not want to tie up primary fireground channels. Command on Red asked if I had MABAS Gold and I said "Yes" and was told to communicate on Gold. I fumbled with the VHF radio in the rig – I could not find Gold (I never had to use it before and forgot it was on a different zone in the radio). I reported no success with Gold back on MABAS Red and was told to stand-by. Twenty minutes passed

and no one got back to us. *"They must be busy"* I said to my partner. Every so often, another fire truck would pass us.


Finally, I used my cell phone to call Chief Rice who I suspected was on scene. He put me through to Chief Hansen who was also in the Command Post. He asked me my location – I went out in the cold wind to search for a street sign. Chief Hansen told me to go just up the road I mentioned and it would take us to the A-side where the command post was located.

As we approached the food processing plant, we encountered a 5-inch large diameter hose stretched across Honey Lake road about 50 feet from the driveway that we needed to access. We called back on the radio and were told that we would have to *"go around the lake – find a tender and follow it"*.

We turned around and started driving along streets that we thought were on the other side of the lake – there was a large area of darkness to the east of us so we assumed that was the lake. We kept driving north when we suddenly saw flashing lights up ahead. They turned right so we raced to that spot and also turned.

This road was dark, curvy, hilly, and covered with snow making it hard to see the edges of the two lane road (at least we assumed it was 2 lanes). *Google Maps did not prepare us for that.*

The fire truck ahead of us kept disappearing around bends. It looked like it turned right again, so when we got to that intersection, we turned also. Around yet another curve, the



Tenders took Bieneman Rd to Spring Prairie Rd to Honey Lake Rd. Distance of approximately 2.5 miles. Wind Lake Fire Chief Rob Robbins reported that his tender put on 300 miles shuttling water during the fire.

truck was nowhere to be seen. The road came to a "T", so we chose right again. By that time, another emergency vehicle was coming up behind us.

We kept driving south now, in the dark. Suddenly, there it was on the left – the food processing plant. We pulled into the parking lot and found a spot out of the way.

It turned out that the **Southwest Wisconsin Incident Management Team (SEW-IMT)** was on scene and was awaiting authorization to deploy large signs with arrows to guide vehicles around the lake.

That definitely would have helped distant responders like us that were unfamiliar with the area and would have made the route safer and less stressful.

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS - THE WHO, WHAT AND WHY?

BY KEITH TVEIT, WISCONSIN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FIRE SERVICES COORDINATOR AND REACT CENTER DIRECTOR

Ever heard of an Incident Management Team (IMT)? Perhaps some people have while others have not. Some may have heard of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources IMT's which are best known for their skills in wildland firefighting incident management but have been used in a variety of different capacities over the years.

One such example would be for their skills in volunteer management after a large scale natural disaster such as the flooding of 2007 & 2008 or for managing and coordinating volunteers involved in a large scale search for a missing or lost individual.

IMT's are *comprised of multi-disciplined "subject matter experts"* in the Incident Command System-Command and General Staff positions (the command and control element) who volunteer their time to sever as an IMT member.

These individuals attend a 40-hour Command and General Staff class and then specialize in a specific command or general staff functional area such as the Operations Section Chief, or the Incident Liaison Officer of the Command Staff (all specialty areas require additional training and the hours vary based on the position) IMT's are sometimes referred to as "overhead teams". That is "the who" IMT's are.

The "what" as it relates to an IMT is "what can they do for you"? You have "100-year" fire in your community and you have exhausted all of your command staff. You are looking at additional operational periods and have utilized all of the Chief's on your MABAS Card. Now what?

In your Special Equipment section on your MABAS Box Card at the 4th or 5th alarm level have a notation to have your Communications Center contact either your County Emergency Management Director and ask that they reach out to Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) and ask for the assistance of an Incident Management Team.

"What an IMT will not do: take over your scene!" – Keith Tveit

Your other option would be to contact the WEM Duty Officer at 1-800-943-0003 and ask for the assistance on an Incident Management Team. The WEM Duty Officer will then reach out and contact the Regional Incident Management Team Leader (note: there are presently 3 Regional IMT's (southeast, southwest and east central) with on-going work to build out a Regional asset in the west central, northeast and northwest WEM regions) (note: if you are in a region that does not have an IMT the closest most available IMT will be deployed).

In some cases you may not need the whole IMT but rather just some specific skills areas for example: Planning, Finance/Admin or perhaps the PIO function if you are not comfortable dealing with the media. The IMT is there to provide you the assistance you need. **What an IMT will not do: take over your scene!**

If it turns out there will be multiple operational periods you as a local Incident Commander may elect to "transfer command" to a subordinate or perhaps even to an IMT. If that is the case you will need to do so with

a *written delegation of authority* to the IMT Leader. In addition, IMT members are also very familiar with and proficient at completing the necessary paperwork such as the ICS forms.

Why consider utilization of an IMT? They come is no cost and will stay as long as needed (they are for the most part self-sufficient). They are subject matter experts in the incident command system as well as position specific areas so if you are short command staff you could place an IMT member into the skill area needed.

The IMT like ICS and MABAS expands and contracts based on situational need. They work very well in the background to support the local incident commander. Yet another reason to consider the use of an IMT is you have a complex incident and you need someone to talk to or shadow you to offer guidance or direction, IMT members can provide this level of service as well.

In closing, I would strongly encourage you on your next MABAS Box Card update to list your regional IMT as a resource in your special equipment section at the 4th or 5th alarm level. If it turns you don't need the resource you can always cancel the IMT like any other resource on the MABAS Box Card.

If you have questions or would like to learn more about the use of Incident Management Teams please do not hesitate to contact me. *Remember it is easier to be proactive rather than reactive, but either way MABAS is your solution!* Thank you and have a fire safe day!

DIV 109 IN ACTION - MILWAUKEE USES AN INTERDIVISIONAL DIVE REQUEST BY GARY SCHMIDT

It is hard to imagine a greater individual challenge to a firefighter than a rescue operation for a plane crash into Lake Michigan.

One must dive to depths of more than 40 feet, work around jagged pieces of fuselage, spilled fuel, strong current, challenging waves, limited visibility, and looming darkness, to rescue or recover the passengers.

On Saturday July 27, 2013, it took an Interdivisional MABAS response, to do just that. A four-passenger Piper Cherokee took off from Racine's Batten Airport around 2:30pm and headed north, possibly to the Oshkosh EAA AirVenture event. A short while later, controllers at Milwaukee's Mitchell Airport notified the US Coast Guard that a plane disappeared from the radar over Lake Michigan.

The Coast Guard requested assistance from the City of Milwaukee Fire Department's fireboat. The Flight for Life Helicopter also responded and was used until the Coast Guard air support would arrive. By 3pm, wreckage was located and the City of Milwaukee

activated their Dive Team. The site was three miles east of Mitchell Airport, about two miles from shore.

Divers had less than 5 hours of daylight to work with. Supporting them were Zodiac boats and jet skis from the Milwaukee Fire Department. The fuselage was quickly located. That began the arduous task of rescue/recovery from 42 feet below the surface.

All off-duty divers were recalled to duty. In addition, the City of Milwaukee **Div 109 made a MABAS Interdivisional Request to Div 107**

(Milwaukee County) for the Franklin FD divers and the South Milwaukee FD fireboat, **and to Div 102** for the City of Racine Dive Team and the Racine County Dive Team. The City of Racine also sent their fireboat. Numerous boats from Law Enforcement agencies also responded.

Through this joint effort, the pilot and his passenger were recovered before darkness. Dive operations continued as it was not known if all four seats were in use. It was determined the next day that all victims were recovered.



The Milwaukee Fire Dept Incident Command Post at the Coast Guard Staging location
(Photo by Chuck Liedtke)



Divers from Divisions 109, 107, and 102 discuss the operation
(Photo by Chuck Liedtke)



The Racine County (Div 102) Water Rescue Response Team was one of several called to the scene. (Photo by Chuck Liedtke)

REFLECTING ON THE PREVIOUS LARGEST MABAS DEPLOYMENT BY GARY SCHMIDT

Prior to the Echo Lake Foods fire in Burlington, the 2009 Cudahy Wisconsin meatpacking plant fire was the largest. **Dan Mayer** had been a Chief in Cudahy for only 3 months, coming from a shift commander role in another Div 107 department. He was still in the process of learning the system as well as the types of businesses he needed to protect. In addition, MABAS Wisconsin did not have a Regional Coordinator position yet and adjacent Divisions, 106 (Waukesha County), 109 (Milwaukee City), and 119 (Ozaukee County), were still in training and setup (not yet live) with MABAS.

The MABAS system was in the early stages of use in Milwaukee County - the largest incident to date of the Patrick Cudahy fire for Div. 107 was a 3rd alarm box (also in Cudahy) and just box levels prior to that.

Chief Mayer recalls: *“Fortunately, several chief officers from Division 107 including my Cudahy officers stepped into action at various positions i.e. Planning and Logistics*

to activate and oversee the MABAS system. The system was new and untested to this level, but it came together well because of the efforts of several knowledgeable individuals and we did have the benefit of having gone through a “dry run” with our 3^d alarm of two months prior.”

It did not matter that Divisions 106, 109, and 119 were not fully active yet with MABAS as Mayer reports: *“When our MABAS Division 107 card was filled, and other support was still necessary, strike teams and task forces as well as single unit assets were individually summoned by the MABAS management team. This team was based on scene as Planning and Logistics and at the Wauwatosa (MABAS Div 107) Dispatch Center where Deputy Chief Bill Rice put the necessary details together”.*

Chief Rice remembers it well: *“I was stationed in the Division 107 Dispatch Center (Wauwatosa Fire and Police Communications center) for many hours. I found myself making numerous calls to contacts in*

neighboring Divisions and back to the State Fire Coordinator Keith Tveit regarding availability of Task Forces and Strike Teams”.

“It was only later that many outside observers realized those actions would become the essential duties of a Regional Coordinator.”

As the fire raged on, there were overwhelming circumstances - the City of Cudahy was evacuated for a time due to a looming issue with ammonia storage tanks, there was a potentially significant economic impact to Cudahy, there was an unprecedented number of resources called to the scene, the water supply of the city almost failed, and the bulk of the fire lasted for several days. Yet, Chief Mayer appeared calm, collected, and measured in the numerous news updates provided seemingly around the clock to the area residents.

Chief Mayer commented on that. *“I learned long ago that the successful outcome of an event depends not only on the skills and abilities of those managing the event but also on the ability of the person or persons in charge to maintain a reassuring, calm composure. One of the jobs of Command is to inspire confidence in those he is leading. When Command or a command officer portrays nervousness or gets excited or yells, it doesn’t inspire confidence. Moreover, this could be a sign that his or her rational thought process might be compromised. This will negatively impact the thought process of others on the scene that must remain clear-headed”.*

“If viewed by the public, a lack of confidence may negatively impact the public’s perception of the competence of the fire department which could have a number of implications for the short term as well as for the long

(Continued on page 9)



The view from the Patrick Cudahy staging area, about 16 hours into the fire
(Photo by Chuck Liedtke)

REFLECTING ON THE PREVIOUS LARGEST MABAS DEPLOYMENT - CONTINUED

(Continued from page 8)

term. If Command is not in control, things can spiral out of control at every level”.

“Additionally, I am a firm believer in the value of getting the correct information out to the public from a trusted source in a timely manner. This is especially important when the incident impacts and inconveniences our citizens as this one did. I believe in providing the media with the information that they need to do their job in a responsible manner”.

“That information should come from a fire chief, chief officer, PIO - someone with direct responsibility and knowledge of the incident. This is far more beneficial than forcing the media to find their own sources of information like the “expert” off the street who suddenly becomes the authority on the story and who may possibly give information that may not be accurate.

I think we owe it to the public to inform them that we are doing everything that can be done to control and neutralize the situation. We need to recognize that providing a good stream of correct information is part of our job”.

In the case of the Patrick Cudahy fire, which lasted for most of the week, what was the secret that kept things under control? Chief Mayer said:

“Ultimately, the Fire Chief is responsible and accountable for every decision made on an emergency scene. But no Fire Chief can do it by himself. If he tries, he may stretch his abilities too thin which could jeopardize the outcome of the situation”.

“So I used people and I delegated and trusted that they would do their best as the professionals they are. I had a radio and was regularly informed and briefed on all decisions being made. I didn’t have to make every decision but I was aware of every decision that was made. If I questioned something I would meet face-to-face and review the plan. There is usually more than one right way to accomplish something and for the most part, chief officers generally come to similar conclusions for action”.

Still, with it being so easy with MABAS to call for lots of help, especially with Interdivisional Requests, were there any pitfalls that a Chief needs to be aware of so as not to become overwhelmed?

Chief Mayer replied: *“A chief needs to remember that when you call additional resources, those resources are not just firefighters. Those resources include officers. Those officers can be a valuable resource to Command in organizing*


and overseeing operations and maintaining the overall safety of the scene. So, delegate, delegate, delegate –use your fellow officers. They are trained, experienced and they know their job as well or maybe better than you do. Take advantage of their expertise for the good of the situation”.

Metropolitan Milwaukee has over five dozen fire departments, providing an abundance of chiefs to draw upon. This may not be the case with other areas of the State. Yet, any chief may find themselves in that once-in-a-lifetime fire. Chief Mayer was asked if things differ based on locale?

“It all comes down to covering your basics, the basics of the ICS, the basics of emergency mitigation. I don’t think things differ in the way a scene should be managed. The ICS should be put in action and expanded as the incident expands or requires. That especially means delegating section supervision and holding regular briefing sessions to ensure that each section is working off of the same Action Plan”, Chief Mayer said.

Chief Rice adds: *“The Patrick Cudahy Fire Operations benefited from numerous responding Chief Officers from throughout the Southeast. After arriving at Staging, most were reassigned to some command function. Looking back, clearly our more modern IMT’s would have been extremely useful in augmenting the Command responsibilities at this incident”.*

In August, 2013, Patrick Cudahy is celebrating its 125th anniversary in Cudahy, something that MABAS had assisted in making happen.



Some of the many Chiefs that assisted at the Patrick Cudahy fire (Photos by Chuck Liedtke)

THE SOUTHEAST WISCONSIN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAM

BY MARK G. STIGLER, INSTRUCTOR, WAUKESHA COUNTY TECHNICAL COLLEGE

The State has encouraged and assisted in establishing what are called "Local/Tribal Incident Management Teams." These teams assist in Type 3 and 4 incidents with multiple operational periods. Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM) has been a driver in getting these teams set up all over the state.

A Local/Tribal Incident Management Team (LTIMT) is a functional, multi-disciplinary and/or multi-jurisdictional group assembled for the purpose of completing and/or enhancing the incident command system at the local, regional or tribal response level. The team can also be used for

large-scale events that require pre-planning.

The **Southeast Wisconsin Incident Management Team (SEW IMT)** was started with funding and support from the Milwaukee (Wisconsin) Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). LTIMTs around the state are designed to be used in incidents that fall between **FEMA Incident Type IV and III** designations but have been deployed mostly in Type III incidents (see green box on page 12). The regional and tribal teams are locally sponsored, controlled and hosted and are regional resources but are not "state owned" assets. The DNR and DOT teams

are owned by their State agencies. The teams have quarterly statewide meetings hosted by WEM where team leaders from all of the LTIMTs around the state come together to discuss best practices, AARs etc. As of today, there are 7 teams of this type in place around the state with another in development. They are:

- Southeast Regional Team
- Southwest Regional Team
- Northeast Regional Team
- Department of Natural Resources
- Wisconsin Dept of Transportation
- Tribal team
- Wisconsin Dept of Corrections
- Stevens Point (under development)

Some of these teams have been deployed to large or complex fires, public health emergencies and other large events/incidents. They are all-hazard in nature and can assist in disasters, large fires or exercises.



The SEW IMT in Action at Echo Lake Foods: (Left to right): Assistant team Leader Rob Ugaste, Team Member Roy Schulpius, Team Member Jessie Elba, Board President Jim Ley, Team Leader Mark Stigler, Team member Kathy Schwei (back to camera) (Photo by SEW IMT)

How to Contact Us

Your contributions to the various columns will make this newsletter a success. Let us know about your MABAS response activity at garyschmidt@wi.rr.com. In particular, pictures of activity are needed.

Echo Lake Foods Fire - Facts and Stats

- 50 residents evacuated from the area
- 11 MABAS Divisions responded from Wisconsin and Illinois
- Over 90 Fire Departments and 300 Firefighters used
- Water supplied from yard hydrants, tender operation, and draft from Echo Lake
- 3.5 million gallons of water used (estimated) from Burlington Municipal Water system
- 1.5 million gallons of water used from Echo Lake
- Largest MABAS deployment since Cudahy WI meatpacking plant fire of 2009

DO YOUR MABAS CARDS LOOK LIKE THIS? *BY SOUTH SHORE FD DIVISION CHIEF MARK PIERCE, MABAS DIVISION 102 PRESIDENT*

Do not call 107 for tender's call 106 instead

Bill Rice - MABAS COOR SE 414 333 3626

DEPARTMENT NAME: CITY OF BURLINGTON	BOX ALARM TYPE: STRUCTURE FIRE	EFFECTIVE DATE: 4/1/2011	MABAS DIVISION: 102
BOX ALARM #: 920-21	LOCATION OR AREA: MULTI FAMILY, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL	AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE: <i>Richard A. Lodle</i>	

LOCAL DISPATCH AREA: **Command 210-0132**

ALARM LEVEL	ENGINES	TENDERS	TRUCKS	SQUADS	EMS	CHIEFS	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	CHANGE OF QUARTERS (STA #)
STILL	CITY OF BURLINGTON		CITY OF BURLINGTON		BURLINGTON RESCUE	CITY OF BURLINGTON	BURLINGTON RESCUE 930	MEDIX (EMS)
WORKING STILL	TOWN OF BURLINGTON					TOWN OF BURLINGTON		

MABAS BOX ALARM:

ALARM LEVEL	ENGINES	TENDERS	TRUCKS	SQUADS	EMS	CHIEFS	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT	CHANGE OF QUARTERS (STA #)
BOX	ROCHESTER KANSASVILLE	2	UNION GROVE	SILVER LAKE	WATERFORD	ROCHESTER WATERFORD		LYONS (ENGINE) LYONS (CHIEF)
2 ND	WHEATLAND TICHIGAN	3 Lyons			MEDIX	KANSASVILLE TICHIGAN	RACINE FIRE BELLS THOMAS BUS (SCHOOL BUS)	PARATECH (EMS) Call ph#
3 RD	WIND LAKE SOUTH SHORE	2	LAKE GENEVA	BRISTOL	PARIS	SOUTH SHORE LAKE GENEVA		
4 TH	RACINE TWIN LAKES	2			RAYMOND	RAYMOND		
5 TH	MUKWONAGO	3	ELKHORN	EAST TROY	SALEM	ELKHORN		
INTERDIVISIONAL REQUEST		1 ST CHOICE 103		2 ND CHOICE 101		3 RD CHOICE 106 if need tenders		Fuel

INFORMATION: City of Burlington Fire Station located at 165 W. Washington Street
 MEDIX Ambulance (262) 763-8438
 PARATECH Ambulance (262) 638-8888
 THOMAS BUS (262) 939-1455 / (262) 210-2911
 DIV 103 Task Force enroute

5 tenders
 Huntley, McHenry, Marengo, Cary, Woodstock, 2 chiefs - Harvard & Richmond

This is what the MABAS card used for the Echo Lake Foods fire looked like afterwards. There is a method to the Division 102 Dispatch Center - a circle means the resource has called enroute, one slash through the circle means on scene, a second slash forming an X means returning to quarters.

Echo Lake Foods - Lessons Learned

- It is very easy to call for additional resources under MABAS. However, command and control must be expanded accordingly as the incident escalates.
- A Chief Officer is needed at the MABAS Dispatch Center for large incidents
- Accountability is crucial as additional resources can flood the scene. Keeping track of who is in staging, who is assigned to do which tasks, where are they located, are resources being rehabbed on a timely basis, who has left the scene, and are there resources to replace those who have left the scene, is imperative.
- Use the MABAS frequencies. At the Burlington Echo lake Foods fire, nine different radio frequencies were used. What might work for a local incident will not work when resources from distant areas come to a scene.

MABAS-WISCONSIN IN ACTION

ECHO LAKE FOODS - DEPLOYMENT OF THE SEW IMT *BY MARK G. STIGLER, SEW IMT TEAM LEADER*

The **Southeast Wisconsin Incident Management Team (SEW IMT)** was requested by Southeast Region WEM Director to respond to and assist in the management of the major structure fire in the City of Burlington on January 30 and 31st, 2013.

Eighteen members of the team did respond with the equipment trailer and worked in shifts over three operational periods. The total time of this deployment for the team from request to close-out was 19.5 hours (1-30-13 @ 8:55pm through 1-31-12 @ 4:30pm).

The team utilized its laptop computers and MiFi ("My WiFi" or mobile hotspot) to assist in developing situational awareness for the Incident Commander through the building of the **ICS 201**, assisted in

documenting communications through the **ICS 205** and created a safety plan.

The SITU opened an Esponder site and maintained the event log throughout the duration of the incident.

The team assigned a Liaison with the on-scene Incident Commander to build a common operating picture and gave briefings to the IC and his staff.

The ICS201 with aerial maps were copied and given out to incoming personnel. Notes were documented for the after action report.

The team had several deployments to exercises and events prior to this fire but this was the team's first emergency deployment.

Many lessons were learned by the team and corrective actions were taken immediately. Our deployment SOPs were modified based upon our experiences. The team conducts training throughout the year to maintain currency.

ICS Forms

The Incident Command System (ICS) utilizes numerous forms to maintain the manageability of a large scale incident:

ICS 201 consists of:

- Incident Briefing with Map Sketch
- Summary of Current Actions
- Current Organization
- Summary of Resources

ICS 202 - Incident Objectives
 ICS 203 - Organization Assignments
 ICS 204 - Individual Assignments
 ICS 205 - Radio Communications Plan

FEMA Incident Typing: Incidents may be typed in order to make decisions about resource requirements. Incident types are based on the following (summarized for space considerations) five levels of complexity. (Source: U.S. Fire Administration)	
Type 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The incident can be handled with one or two single resources with up to six personnel. • Command and General Staff positions (other than the Incident Commander) are not activated. • The incident is contained within the first operational period and often within an hour to a few hours after resources arrive on scene.
Type 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Command staff and general staff functions are activated only if needed. • Several resources are required to mitigate the incident, but incident is usually limited to one operational period in the control phase. • The agency administrator may have briefings, and ensure the complexity analysis and delegation of authority are updated. • No written Incident Action Plan (IAP) is required but a documented operational briefing will be completed for all incoming resources. • The role of the agency administrator includes operational plans including objectives and priorities.
Type 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When capabilities exceed initial attack, the appropriate ICS positions should be added to match the complexity of the incident. • A Type 3 IMT or incident command organization manages initial action incidents with a significant number of resources, an extended attack incident until containment/control is achieved, or an expanding incident until transition to a Type 1 or 2 IMT. • The incident may extend into multiple operational periods, and a written IAP may be required for each operational period.
Type 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This type of incident extends beyond the capabilities for local control and is expected to go into multiple operational periods. A Type 2 incident may require the response of resources out of area, including regional and/or national resources, to effectively manage the operations, command, and general staffing. • A written IAP is required for each operational period. • Operations personnel normally do not exceed 200 per operational period and total incident personnel do not exceed 500 (guidelines only).
Type 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This type of incident is the most complex, requiring national resources to safely and effectively manage and operate. • All Command and General Staff positions are activated. • Operations personnel often exceed 500 per operational period and total personnel will usually exceed 1,000. • There is a high impact on the local jurisdiction, requiring additional staff for office administrative and support functions.

INTERDIVISIONAL REQUESTS PROMPT REHAB SUMMIT BY GARY SCHMIDT

Seven rehab groups used on MABAS cards in southern Wisconsin and northern Illinois met to discuss a regional coordination during large scale MABAS incidents.

The full implementation of MABAS in the Southeast Region of Wisconsin has resulted in four MABAS incidents with Interdivisional requests in four years. Incidents with Interdivisional requests generally double or triple the amount of resources coming to a scene and these events have been multiple days in duration.

The local rehab groups become overwhelmed at these extraordinary

events with so many resources coming to a scene requiring rehab.

The meeting involved the Racine Fire Bells (on MABAS cards in Div 101, 102, 103, 106), Milwaukee Fire Bell Club (Div 107, 109, 111, 119), North Prairie FD Auxiliary (Div 106), Sullivan EMS Rehab (Div 118, 106), Southern Wisconsin Emergency Preparedness Team or SWEPT (Div 104), and Metropolitan Emergency Support Services or MESS (Div 1, 3, 4). Waukesha County Emergency Support & Rehab (Div 106) could not attend.

Discussed was the potential to

appoint a Regional Rehab Coordinator to work alongside the MABAS Regional Coordinator to assist the local rehab group to set up operational work periods involving the other groups during large scale MABAS incidents.

The meeting was attended by MABAS SE Regional Coordinator Bill Rice and was hosted by Kansasville Fire Chief Scott Remer in Racine County.



Rehab volunteers review the proposal
(Photo by Chuck Liedtke)



Gary Schmidt, Director of Rehab for the Milwaukee Fire Bell Club, leads the discussion of coordinating rehab across the region.

Grafton Fire Chief / MABAS SE Regional Coordinator Bill Rice (seated) provided the volunteer groups with perspective on how MABAS coordinates regional responses of fire department resources.

(Photo by Chuck Liedtke)

**MABAS Wisconsin
General Mailing Address
PO Box 233
Camp Douglas, WI 54618**

MABAS WISCONSIN IN ACTION STAFF

- Content Editor.....Gary Schmidt (Milwaukee Fire Bell Club)
- Format Editor.....Terry Schmidt (Milwaukee Fire Bell Club)
- ContributorTim Stein (Racine Fire Bells)
- ContributorDrew Spielman (Green Bay Fire Dept)
- ContributorLloyd Schultz (Johnson Creek Fire Dept)

For more information about becoming a member of MABAS-Wisconsin or to view all issues of this newsletter, visit: www.mabaswisconsin.org (scroll down for newsletter links)



MABAS – Wisconsin

Mutual Aid Box Alarm System

Organized 2004


MABAS Wisconsin Regional Coordinators

Northwest Region

Phil Bochler

Ph. (715) 492-7235

assessor@cityofparkfalls.com



West Central Region

Rick Merryfield

Ph. (715) 577-7110

rickmerryfield@chipvalley.com

Southwest Region

Bruce Hedrington

Ph. (608) 751-6203

Ph. (815) 289-1092

hedrington@ci.beloit.wi.us

brucehedrington@gmail.com

Southeast Region

Bill Rice

Ph. (414) 333-3626

wrice@graffton.village.wi.us

Red Center

Ph. (T.B.D.)

WEM Duty Officer

Ph. 800-943-0003

Fire Service Coordinator

Keith Tveit

Ph. (608) 220-6049

keith.tveit@wisconsin.gov

Wisconsin Homeland Security Council

Brad Liggett

Ph. (608) 364-2902

Divisions

- 101 – Kenosha County
- 102 – Racine County
- 103 – Walworth County
- 104 – Rock County
- 105 – Green County
- 106 – Waukesha County
- 107 – Milwaukee County
- 108 – Grant County
- 109 – Milwaukee City
- 110 – Portage County
- 111 – Washington County
- 112 – Brown County
- 113 – Sheboygan County
- 114 – Oneida County
- 115 – Dane County
- 116 – Wood County
- 117 – Dunn/Pepin County
- 118 – Jefferson County
- 119 – Ozaukee County
- 120 – Fond du Lac County
- 121 – Vilas County
- 122 – Calumet County
- 123 – Winnebago County
- 124 – Iowa County
- 125 – Lafayette County
- 126 – Eau Claire County
- 127 – Outagamie County
- 128 – Manitowoc County
- 129 – Dodge County
- 130 – Marathon County
- 131 – Sauk County
- 132 – Chippewa County
- 133 – Shawano/Menominee Cnty
- 134 – La Crosse County
- 135 – Columbia County
- 136 – Juneau County
- 137 – Oconto County
- 138 – Kewaunee County
- 139 – Jackson County
- 140 – Trempealeau County
- 141 – Green Lake County
- 142 – Waupaca County
- 143 – St. Croix County
- 144 – Marinette County
- 145 – Monroe County
- 146 – Florence County
- 147 – Langlade County

MABAS OPERATING FREQUENCIES

IFERN

IFERN2

MABAS1 (WISCOM)

MABAS2 (WISCOM)

MABAS Alerting / intra-Divisional responses

Alternate intra-Divisional responses

Inter-Divisional Responses

Contact with Wisconsin Red Center

Regional Coordinators - WEM Coordination*

*Future use